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THE LAW OF PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF
SPECTRUM: A CRITICAL COMPARISON
John Berresford* and Wayne Leighton**
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience ... The substance of the law
at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood
to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out
desired results, depend very much upon its past.
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
Debate rages about whether the allocation and management of the radio
frequency spectrum2 should be mostly a political process, treating it as "The
People's Airwaves," or mostly market-driven, treating it as private property.
Those who favor political management warn of"a few corporations controlling
the people's airwaves'3 and downplay the First Amendment4 as merely
* Attorney, Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; Adjunct Professor of
Law, George Mason University School of Law; Proprietor,
http://www.johnwberresford.com; A.B., Washington University (St. Louis), 1972; J.D.,
Washington University School of Law, 1975.
** Visiting Professor, Francisco Marroquin University, Guatemala City, Guatemala (2004-
2005) and on leave from the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission. B.S., Texas A&M University, 1987; Ph.D., George Mason Univer-
sity, 1996.
1 OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (Little, Brown & Co., 1881).
2 For simplicity, we will use the word "spectrum" to refer to the radio frequency spec-
trum. We do not mean "spectrum" to include the media by which light and noise audible to
humans are transmitted. We also understand that, strictly speaking, the spectrum by which
communication is possible is the transient interactivity of electrons rather than relatively
permanent and tangible elements such as land or water.
3 Richard L. Grossman, Wresting Governing Authority from the Corporate Class: Driv-
ing People into the Constitution, I SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 147, 148 (2002); see also ROBERT
W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, OUR MEDIA, NOT THEIRS: THE DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE
AGAINST CORPORATE MEDIA (Seven Stories Press, 2002); Michael J. Copps, The "Vast
Wasteland" Revisited: Headed for More of the Same?, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 478 (2003)
(stating "the public interest.., is the service broadcasters are supposed to provide in return
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"aspirational. ' 5 In contrast, the market/property rights side sees television, for
example, as "just another appliance-a toaster with pictures,"6 and calls for the
spectrum to be "propertyzed"7 so that its potential may be realized
This article attempts to shed some light on these arguments, which have
generated much heat. In particular, this article critically examines an analogy
between property law, especially about land, and the way the United States
treats the spectrum. This analogy has its roots in the observation, first made by
Ronald Coase almost halfa century ago, that both spectrum and land are scarce
resources that require some allocation mechanism, and that the price system
coupled with property rights provides an efficient allocation.9 A common
assumption by many who have posited this analogy has been that the law has
handled land in an efficient manner producing an efficient outcome'0 - but has
not done as well with spectrum. From here, it is straightforward to conclude
that spectrum law and policy should be revised, or perhaps largely scrapped, so
as to make this resource more property-like.
The analogy between property law and spectrum law, however, is both
overstated and underdeveloped. The analogy is overstated because spectrum
was defined in some of the earliest telecommunications law as not being
property per se. The Communications Act of 1934 specifically states that its
purpose is to allow the "use" by persons of all the "channels of radio
transmission ... but not the ownership thereof."" It is true that over time
spectrum has acquired property-like characteristics, such as longer license
for their licenses to use the people's airwaves."). As we note below, a new version of the
political management side is that the spectrum should consist of government-defined
"commons" or parks. See generally Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified
Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004).
4 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press..." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5 JAMES P. STEYER, THE OTHER PARENT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MEDIA'S EFFECT ON
OUR CHILDREN 129 (Atria Books, 2002) ("The First Amendment is romantic. It is aspira-
tional.").
6 Caroline E. Mayer, FCC Chief's Fears: Fowler Sees Threat in Regulation, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 1983, at K I (quoting former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler).
7 See generally Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why
It's Important, & How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 19 (2000).
8 See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance & the Choice Between
Private & Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003).
9 Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 14
(1959).
10 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29-33 (Little, Brown & Co., 1986).
Posner advanced the proposition that the common law, as it pertains to property, is generally
efficient. Id. By this, it is meant that the development and protection of property rights cre-
ates incentives for owners of scarce resources to use these resources efficiently and address
conflicts between competing users efficiently. Id.
II 47 U.S.C. §301 (2000).
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terms with an expectation of renewal, some flexibility in how the spectrum is
used, and some ability to transfer the license to other parties; however, these
rights are limited. For example, for most licensees, there is little flexibility that
allows for different uses of the spectrum, and license transfers are subject to
review by the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission"). 2
The analogy is underdeveloped because, despite these differences, there are
important parallels, both in terms of their defining characteristics and their
development over time. Many of the defining characteristics of property also
define spectrum. Both land and spectrum are valuable, divisible, and
improvable with technology. Also, some kinds of land and spectrum are more
productive than others. 3 There is also a remarkable similarity between the
laws, customs, and practices that have emerged over time to govern the usage
of each. The same conflicts, the same defining traits, the same principles of
decision, and the same solutions can be found in their respective backgrounds.
We agree that if property law is in fact more efficient than spectrum law,
then making spectrum more property-like will improve efficiency. To talk of
scrapping present spectrum law and replacing it with "property rights,"
however, is to throw the baby out with the bathwater. First, improving
spectrum law will require a better understanding of how it is similar to
property law. Second, reform may most need to focus on the precise definition
of rights to the spectrum. These rights were ill-defined almost 80 years ago
and, despite the emergence of relatively efficient institutions for addressing
spectrum use, remain in need of reform today. Finally, such reform must also
recognize that, much as defining rights to land has not been simple, clarifying
the rights to spectrum will be a complex task.
II. THE LAW OF LAND AND THE LAW OF SPECTRUM IN THE
UNITED STATES
The following admittedly brief survey of the law of property, specifically
land law, and the law of spectrum discusses the similarity between these bodies
of law in terms of their early development, their key elements, and their means
for resolving usage disputes.
12 Much spectrum is regulated under a "command-and-control" model, with prescribed,
narrow uses. For a discussion of flexibility in use and different regulatory models for spec-
trum, see FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT,
at http:/ihraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-228542Al.pdf (released Nov.
2002).




Virtually all land recognized under the jurisdiction of the United States
started out as government property. The British colonies were originally
comprised of tracts from the King or Queen of England, 4 and westward
expansions, such as the Louisiana Purchase, began with the U.S. government's
acquisition of land from other entities or governments.
Government subsequently made vast amounts of land available for private
ownership. Periodic decisions over the first centuries of American history
granted large and small amounts of land to "veterans, settlers, squatters,
railroads, states, colleges, speculators, and land companies."' 6 These policies
were set by Congress and attempted to strike a balance between building
essential infrastructure, e.g., railroads, 7 development by small property-
holders, e.g., homesteading"8 and, eventually, conservation. 9 Much land never
became private property, such as land for police and fire departments, public
schools and libraries, other government buildings, and public parks. Laws
about other natural resources, such as air and water, also date back centuries."
They generally allowed less ownership and focused more on facilitating their
use by many persons.2' In contrast to other resources, spectrum was first used
in the United States very recently, about a century ago. The military at first
claimed it all for the purposes of national defense and safety at sea.2 However,
other users such as hobbyists and early broadcasters grew so fast and in such
14 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 59 (2d ed., Simon & Schus-
ter, 1985).
15 Id. at 231; RICHARD B. MORRIS & JEFFREY B. MORRIS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 150 (7th ed., HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1996).
16 FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 231.
17 Id. at 414-15.
18 PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 289-96, 490-92, 515 (Harper-
Collins Publishers, Inc., 1997); MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 15, at 612-13.
19 FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 352, 419-20.
20 Contrary to some property rights folklore, government regulation of important re-
sources and economic activities was intense in the colonial and early American times, and
did not appear first with the New Deal. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 66-67, 183-85; THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 376 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2002) (hereinafter HALL ET AL.).
21 See, e.g., Parker & Edgarton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. 1838) (rejecting the Eng-
lish doctrine of ancient lights); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 365-66.
22 See generally ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER OF BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN
THE UNITED STATES, VOL. I - To 1933 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1966); MARVIN R. BENSMAN,
THE BEGINNING OF BROADCAST REGULATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (McFarland &
Co., 2000); SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899-1912 (Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1988); CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KiTrROSS, STAY TUNED:
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 2002).
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numbers that government was forced to allow significant private use." The
federal government formally nationalized the spectrum in 1927, but significant
use by private persons, mainly for broadcasting, had already become
widespread. 4 The federal government, while prohibiting some uses and
forbidding persons to own spectrum, allowed most existing private uses of
spectrum to continue under licenses. 5 As with land, government (usually
through Congress) provided as it thought best for the country's essential
infrastructure (national defense and other federal activities on spectrum
retained by the federal government, safety-related communications, and
broadcasting networks), homesteading (granting licenses for spectrum to
persons who had pioneered its use), and conservation for future use.26
B. Key Elements
In terms of maximizing efficiency, the most critical rights associated with
any property generally are the rights to exclude others from its use, to
determine how the property will be used, and to transfer these rights to others.27
For example, the owner of land may expect to have his or her rights protected
against trespassers. Similarly, an owner may decide how, or in what manner,
to use his or her land. Finally, the owner of land may transfer it to other
parties, either partially, as in the case of easements, rentals, or parcel sales, or
completely, as in a fee simple sale of the entire seller's land to one buyer.
Yet landowners' rights are limited, substantially in some cases, by law and
regulation. Among other limitations, zoning and environmental laws may
regulate the minimum or maximum amounts of land that may be owned by one
person, the types of structures that may be built on it, and the various uses to
which a piece of land may be put.28 For example, zoning that classifies land as
"residential" prohibits it to be used for a night club or toxic waste dump.
Transfers, too, are subject to zoning, environmental, and other restrictions.
The buyer of land that is zoned for residential use may not, simply by buying
23 See generally BARNOUW, supra note 22; BENSMAN, supra note 22; DOUGLAS, supra
note 22; STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 22.
24 See generally BARNOUW, supra note 22; BENSMAN, supra note 22; DOUGLAS, supra
note 22; STERLING & KTTrROSS, supra note 22.
25 See generally BARNOUW, supra note 22; BENSMAN, supra note 22; DOUGLAS, supra
note 22; STERLING & KiTTROSS, supra note 22.
26 See generally BARNOUW, supra note 22; BENSMAN, supra note 22; DOUGLAS, supra
note 22; STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 22.
27 See Erik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A
Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137, 1139-40 (1972); POSNER, supra note 10,
at 29-33.
28 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); HALL ET AL., supra
note 20, at 847.
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it, escape the "residential" limitation and operate a night club or toxic waste
dump on the property.
In addition, if government wants to take privately owned land for public use,
it may do so by its powers of "eminent domain," although it must afford just
compensation to the owner." Conversely, even where land is open to the
public, such as roads, parks, and sidewalks, government may set rules of good
behavior, such as speed limits and laws prohibiting aggressive panhandling,
and punish those who disobey them."
Many of the same restrictions that affect land use also affect the usage of
spectrum by private companies and persons. Most of the spectrum that people
use everyday is "zoned," meaning that the Commission has allowed for
relatively narrow use, e.g., AM radio or mobile service, and prohibited almost
all others." In some bands, the Commission's zoning has become relatively
permissive in recent years. For example, licensees in the Personal
Communications Service have more leeway than the earlier cellular licenses
had in what they may do with their spectrum.32
Similarly, spectrum licenses are transferable, though in practice they have
been less so. All transfers of spectrum licenses are subject to review by the
Commission to determine whether "the public interest, convenience, and
necessity will be served thereby."33  Some, though not the majority, of all
transfers of spectrum licenses are delayed by this review. Also, the threat of
such review may deter some transfers that would otherwise occur. No such
review occurs for transfers of land in the United States. In addition, until
recently, there were prohibitions on dividing spectrum, either by frequency
blocks (e.g., a licensee with 20 MHz transferring only 10 MHz to a buyer) or
by geographic blocks (e.g., a licensee with spectrum in a geographic area
29 FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 182; HALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 378; U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.").
30 See, e.g., Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of a city ordinance prohibiting aggressive panhandling).
31 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §2.106 (2003) (allowing 535-1605 kHz to be used for "broadcast-
ing" and allowing 866-869 MHz to be used for "land mobile" service). In other bands, there
are various users with primary or secondary status, though their respective rights generally
are well-defined. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§2.106 (2003), US Footnote 218 (allowing 902-928
MHz to be used location and monitoring uses, but forbidding them to interfere harmfully
with government stations and requiring that they "tolerate interference from ... industrial,
scientific, and medical.., devices").
32 Compare In re An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz
for Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 507, para. 87 (1981) (relatively
narrow definition of cellular service) with In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to
Establish New Personal Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd.
7700, para. 24 (1993) (relatively broad definition of broadband PCS).
33 47 U.S.C. §310(d) (2000).
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transferring spectrum rights to only a portion of that area).34
Also, the Commission occasionally exercises the equivalent of eminent
domain by re-allocating spectrum and thereby effectively taking the rights of
the previous users of that spectrum.3" Approximating "just compensation," the
Commission usually makes the taking sufficiently slow so that the present user
can establish itself elsewhere. 6 The Commission may also explicitly require
that the new spectrum user compensate the user being ousted for the cost of
moving to equivalent spectrum.3" Finally, when the Commission creates a
spectrum "commons" akin to a park or sidewalk, it often requires that users
observe "spectrum etiquette" in order that the few not crowd out the many.3 8
C. Resolving Disputes About Use
Many of the general rules and practices for spectrum use described above
are the result, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, not of logic but of specific
conflicts between two or more parties. New conflicts continue to occur,
especially as more people use spectrum in different ways. The following
discussion outlines the remarkable similarity between the principles by which
disputes about the use of land and the use of spectrum are decided.
With land and other natural resources, a "nuisance" is one person's
substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the
resource by its possessor.39 Its gist is unreasonable interference with use and
enjoyment." These same wrongs are recognized and regularly enforced in
resolving disputes about radio spectrum. Disputes arise out of similar factual
settings and thus similar principles are used to decide them. Often, more than
one principle is invoked in a single case. The decision-maker, who may be a
common law judge, a Commission attorney, or Commission engineer, must
34 See In re Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Com-
munications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 4957, 4982-86, 4889-
90, paras. 80-83 (1994).
35 See, e.g., In re Improving Public Safety in the 800 MHz Band, Report and Order,
Fifth Report and Order, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 14969
(2004).
36 See, e.g., STERLING & KiTTROSS, supra note 22, at 249-53 (describing the multi-year
move of FM from 42-50 MHz to its present location).
37 See generally Amendment to the Commission's Rules Regarding a Plan for Sharing
the Costs of Microwave Relocation, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 1923
(1995).
38 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §15.323(b) (2003) (spectrum etiquette for unlicensed personal
communications devices).
39 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, §463 at 1321-23, §465 at 1325-26 (West Group,
2000); HALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 258-59, 808.
40 DOBBS, supra note 39, §463 at 1322.
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decide which principle bears the most weight in each factual setting. Some of
the key principles considered include the following:
1. Is the Interference Worth Government's Attention?
A first principle, which is used to screen out many trivial disputes, is that
not all interferences, pertaining to land or spectrum use will be given redress.
Residents of urban high-rise buildings must accept "the normal noises of
everyday living," such as "the patter of little feet overhead."'" Only
"excessive" or "deliberate" noise can be considered a nuisance.42
In the same vein, the Commission does not guarantee spectrum licensees
freedom from all interference. To merit the Commission's remedial attention,
interference to the complaining licensee must exceed some threshold.43 To that
end, the Commission often directs considerable attention to defining
interference, developing such distinctions as "unreasonable, 44
"unacceptable,"45 or "harmful" interference.46
2. Which Use Was First?
Assuming that the interference complained of is at least the minimum that
the courts or the Commission will recognize, the arguments on the merits
begin. The single strongest argument supporting a party to an interference
41 See, e.g., La. Leasing Co. v. Sokolow, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (1966).
42 Id. at 450.
43 See, e.g., In re Amendment of Parts 21 & 74 of the Comm'n's Rules With Regard to
Licensing in the Multipoint Distribution Serv. and in the Instructional Television Fixed
Serv. for the Gulf of Mexico, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 8446, para. I1
(2002) [hereinafter In re Amendment of Parts 21 & 74]; In re Flexibility for Delivery of
Communications by Mobile Satellite Serv. Providers in the 2 GHz Band, the L Band and the
1.6/2.4 GHz Bands, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd.
1962, para. 11 (2003) [hereinafter In re Flexibility for Delivery of Communications by
Mobile Satellite Serv. Providers]; In re Richtec Inc., 18 FCC Rcd. 3295, para. 17 (2003)
[hereinafter In re Richtec].
44 In re Amendment of Parts 21 & 74, supra note 43, at para. 11 ("[W]ith respect to...
concerns about land-based [licensees] receiving potential unreasonable interference from
any Gulf system(s), we address these concerns [below]...").
45 In re Flexibility for Delivery of Communications by Mobile Satellite Serv. Providers,
supra note 43, at para. Ill (setting a standard of preventing "unacceptable interference" by
satellite receiver noise to certain satellite operations in adjacent channels).
46 In re Richtec, supra note 43, at para. 17 ("Richtec shall not cause harmful interfer-
ence to any other lawfully operating satellite or radio facility and shall cease operations
upon notification of such interference."); see also 47 C.F.R. §2.1 (2003) (defining "accepted
interference," "harmful interference," and "permissible interference"). Several FCC rules
contain interference limits for different services. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§24.238 (for broad-
band Personal Communications Services), 90.307 (for Safety and Special Radio Services).
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dispute is that its use came first in time and that the other party knew, or should
have known, of such use. For instance, homeowners won a nuisance case
against neighbors who stopped using their land to grow wheat and began using
it to raise thousands of hogs with the predictable waste and odor.47
The Commission may take a similar approach in disputes between two radio
licensees operating in the same geographic area, when the latecomer interferes
with the first licensee's operation. An example of the Commission's
application of this principle is the case of licensees for mobile telephone
services operating atop the Peachtree Plaza Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia. 8 A
newly licensed television transmitter placed atop the hotel unexpectedly caused
interference to many mobile telephone operators who used adjacent
frequencies and had been in the area for many years. 49 The Commission
required the television broadcaster, who was the latecomer, to compensate the
established land mobile licensees. °
3. Which Use Is More Valuable?
The second most powerful argument supporting a party to an interference
dispute is that its use is more socially beneficial." The more the interfering use
serves a social or economic good, the more likely it will be allowed by the law
and the Commission. 2 Thus, a cement factory that causes pollution to a
modest number of neighboring homes may be allowed to continue in existence
if it is a major source of investment and employment in the community. 3
Social utility can even trump the "first use" principle in some cases. Thus, in a
county that was once agricultural but has become primarily residential, the last
farmer can be declared a nuisance and required to move his foul-smelling and
insect-ridden operations." Such a result promotes economic development and
benefits a larger number of residents. The hog operation mentioned above
47 Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa 1996) ("Here the Weinholds ac-
quired their farm before the Wolffs started their hog feeding and confinement operation.
The Weinholds therefore clearly enjoyed priority of possession."); DOBBS, supra note 39,
§465, at 1327, 1327 n.12.
48 Broad. Corp. of Ga. (WVEU-TV) Atlanta, Ga., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 96
F.C.C.2d 901, para. 21 (1984) ("WVEU, as the 'newcomer', should be required to reim-




51 We hasten to add that which of two uses of a resource is more socially useful may be
largely in the eye of the beholder.
52 DOBBS, supra note 39, §465, at 1329-30.
53 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
54 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
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might have prevailed if it had cost millions to construct and had been a major
source of employment for the community.
Likewise with the radio spectrum, greater social utility, even by a latecomer,
can force an early user of less value to move or be silenced. Radio stations
with few listeners were required to make way for those which the Commission
thought would attract many listeners;55 an early FM network was effectively
put out of existence, and hundreds of thousands of radios were made useless, to
make way for television. 6 In 1970, much-needed mobile, especially cellular,
service won spectrum away from the few UHF stations that had been on the air
since 1952, and the Bell System's ability to deploy cellular mobile service
across the whole nation quickly won it half the original cellular licenses over
antitrust objections that such an award would prevent cellular service from
competing with the last monopoly in telecommunications, Bell's own wireline
telephone service. A fascinating parallel at the Commission to "the last
farmer" nuisance cases is the continuing litigation being pursued by radio
astronomy operations in once-uninhabited areas seeking protection from radio
transmissions that accompany suburban development, such as certain medical
devices and television."59
4. Assuming That Some Change Must Occur, Which Solution Will Cost The
Least?
In the case described above of the cement factory that provided local
investment and employment, the factory was allowed to continue in operation
55 A NATION TRANSFORMED BY INFORMATION: How INFORMATION HAS SHAPED THE
UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 147-48 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. &
James W. Cortada, eds., Oxford University Press 2000); cf. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra
note 22, at 115, 122-23.
56 ERIK BARNOUW, The GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES, VOL. II - 1933 TO 1953, 130, 242 (Oxford University Press,1968); ROBERT L.
HILLIARD & MICHAEL C. KEITH, THE BROADCAST CENTURY AND BEYOND: A BIOGRAPHY OF
AMERICAN BROADCASTING 105-06 (2001); STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 22, at 156-60,
276-77.
57 In re An Inquiry Relative to Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz; and
Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91, and 93 of the Rules Relative to Operations in
the Land Mobile Service Between 806 and 960 MHz, Report and Order, 19 R.R.2d (P&F)
1663, 1667, para. 13 (1970).
58 In re An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellu-
lar Communications Sys.; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's Rules
Relative to Cellular Communications Sys., Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, paras. 27-
47(1981).
59 See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish a Radio Astronomy
Coordination Zone in Puerto Rico, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 13683
(1998).
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but was required to pay damages.6" The sum of those damages, $1 85 thousand,
was less than the $45 million investment in the cement factory and the 300
jobs that would be obliterated by an injunction closing down the operation.6
Similar minimization of costs can be found in Commission decisions
resolving interference disputes. In the above-mentioned case of the new
television transmitter that interfered with established mobile receivers atop a
building in Atlanta, the Commission first ordered the television transmitter to
use filters, modify its transmitter, and shield the mobile receivers.62 That
spared each party the relatively high cost of moving to a new place or changing
frequencies, but it did not end the interference. The Commission then required
the next least costly remedy, namely requiring the television station to pay the
cost of the mobile operations moving to other frequencies.63
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Radio spectrum and private property are remarkably alike. The rules that
govern their use are also remarkably alike, despite the rhetoric about "The
People's Airwaves" versus "Property Rights." Of these two visions, property
rights likely is the better one, for the same reasons that free markets have
proven superior to centralized planning over the last hundred years. We take
the position that the incentives inherent in a model granting rights such as
exclusivity and transferability in the use of resources tend to lead to efficient
use of those resources. Thus, to the extent that land law better defines,
protects, and enables these rights compared to spectrum law, the latter needs
reform.
Of course, as described above, both land and spectrum law impose
limitations on use. To the extent these limitations address harmful interference
to other users with similar rights, such rules should be economically efficient.
More generally, effective limitations on use should produce more social gains
than losses. Not all limitations can pass such a test, however, and some
limitations cause potentially large net social losses. For example, a UHF TV
licensee may not use the licensed spectrum for cellular service. A 1992 study
by the Commission estimated that in the Los Angeles market alone, removing
this restriction and allowing spectrum to move to a higher valued use, such as
60 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970); see also Spur In-
dus. Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1992) (requiring that suburban-
ites pay relocation costs of "the last farm").
61 Id. at 873.
62 In re Resolution of Interference between UHF channels 14 and 69 and Adja-
cent-channel Land Mobile Operations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking/Notice of Inquiry, 2




cellular service, would have produced a net social gain of over $1 billion for
the time from 1992 until 2000. 64
The challenge, therefore, is for the Commission and Congress to produce
reforms that result in net social gains. The Commission, for its part, can
achieve significant increases in net social welfare through regulatory reform.
In one case, it recently decided that it had the authority to allow certain
wireless radio licensees to trade spectrum usage rights in secondary markets.65
For example, it granted this authority to commercial mobile radio and private
mobile radio licensees.66 To further reform at this level, the Commission
should seek to apply the principles of property law. New allocations of
spectrum should be given considerably more flexibility, while existing
allocations should be reviewed to see if additional rights can be given to
incumbent or other users.
As already noted, applying the principles of property law will not be simple.
Land law includes many forms of ownership, leases, zoning, easements, rights-
of-way, and eminent domain. It also changes to account for new technologies.
For example, for centuries the ownership of land included the air "up to the
heavens." When aircrafts began flying early in the 1900s, land law changed to
say that overflights, most of the time, were neither a trespass nor a nuisance.67
Property rights in spectrum might also draw on the laws about movement of
vessels on water - a resource that is not owned but in which "rules of the road"
allow use by many and mechanisms for efficient use address scarcity where it
exists.68
Congress can also provide significant increases in net social welfare through
legislative reform of spectrum law. For example, Congress authorized the
Commission to auction spectrum in 1993, thus creating a more efficient way to
move this resource to its highest valued use.69 Future reform should make
64 EVAN R. KWEREL & JOHN R. WILLIAMs, FCC, OFFICE OF PLANS & POLICY, CHANGING
CHANNELS: VOLUNTARY REALLOCATION OF UHF TELEVISION SPECTRUM, WORKING PAPER
No. 27, 1992, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/workingpapers/oppwp27.pdf (last vis-
ited Dec. 30, 2003).
65 In re Implementation of Sections 309(j) and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as Amended: Promotion of Spectrum Efficient Technologies on Certain Part 90 Frequen-
cies, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
FCC Rcd. 3034 (2003).
66 Id.
67 DOBBS, supra note 39, §54, at 108-10.
68 For example, while the open seas have considerable space and thus the ability to ac-
commodate virtually all users who obey the rules of the road, harbors and high-traffic wa-
terways must by necessity establish mechanisms, such as docking fees, to efficiently allo-
cate their more scarce operating waters. Where the resources - shipping lanes, specific
spectrum bands, etc. - are scarce, property-like mechanisms may be necessary for efficient
use.
69 47 U.S.C. §309(j) (2000).
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rights to spectrum more property-like, authorizing the Commission to follow
the model of land and other forms of property law in prosperous, economically
developed countries, especially the United States. Other useful reforms might
be to replace the statutory standard for regulatory action ("the public interest,
convenience, and necessity") with something more narrow and less subject to
political and social pressure, such as "productivity" or "efficiency."70 Care
should be taken, however, to avoid substituting one arbitrary standard for
another. A more dramatic but potentially useful reform would be to transition
more of the responsibility for resolving disputes to courts, in effect eliminating
a major role of regulators.7  As noted above, this role has been played by the
Commission throughout its history with some success. Yet assigning to courts
the responsibility of resolving disputes would help focus each branch of
government on its comparative advantage, in addition to making what would
likely be an efficiency-creating move towards a more property-like
arrangement.
Perhaps the only reason that spectrum has lacked these improvements is
historical, that it was discovered, exploited, and became important in
approximately twenty years. It thus provoked more awe and fear than
reasoned comparison to other resources for which bodies of law already
existed.72 If so, then we may be in spectrum law where land law was 100 years
after the Norman Conquest, and it's catch-up time. While regulatory reforms
by the Commission may help considerably, comprehensive catch-up is almost
certainly impossible without legislative reform and, thus, action by Congress.
At the same time, visions must meet real needs and must allow for
exceptions. Just as this country zones land and leaves much of it in
government hands for military activities and parks,73 even a property rights
system may need to leave much spectrum under non-market control. Also,
disruptive new technologies such as Ultra Wideband,74 if their promoters'
70 Cf William H. Read & Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform: Governing Requires a
New Standard, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 289 (1997) (proposing a pro-competitive antitrust stan-
dard).
71 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spec-
trum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase 's "Big Joke ": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335,405 (2001).
72 BRUCE M. OWEN ET AL., TELEVISION ECONOMICS 13 (Lexington Books, 1974).
73 We realize that private owners of land can create efficient parks also, such as Disney
World and Six Flags.
74 Ultra-wideband is a technology that uses very narrow or short duration pulses that
result in very large, or wideband, transmission bandwidths. UWB can use spectrum occu-
pied by other radio services without causing significant interference, thus enabling more
communication on a finite amount of spectrum than was possible before. See, e.g., In re Re-
vision of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Sys-
tems, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 18
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claims prove to be true, may make it easier to establish spectrum "parks" or
commons. These will enable vast private use with government merely
regulating behavior as it does with "Keep off the Grass" signs in parks." On
the other hand, private parties may use these new technologies to make
spectrum available to even more users, perhaps in innovative ways, which in
turn may lessen the need for government commons. v6 The Commission's
recent effort to promote the development of "private" commons is an important
step in this direction and reflects an understanding of the ways in which new
uses and technologies challenge traditionally rigid models of spectrum
regulation."
At a more general yet prominent level, the President's Spectrum Policy
Initiative ("Report") trumpets efficiency as a primary goal." While the Report
also sees a role for non-market treatment of spectrum in some cases, this is not
inconsistent with the argument made above. Rather, if pursued faithfully, it
will move spectrum away from government planning and towards more
property rights, while also retaining commons in specific circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
In short, there is significant need for reform, but there also is cause for
optimism. The Commission's implementation of spectrum regulations has
been better (i.e., closer to the efficiency of a system of property rights and
common law courts) than property rights advocates may admit.79 At the same
time, the opportunity for improvement (i.e., making further efficiency gains) is
greater than defenders of the status quo may admit. We call for "bold,
persistent experimentation""0 in the spectrum with property rights and, where
FCC Rcd. 3857, paras. 3-4 (2003); see also Multispectral Solutions Inc., at
http://www.multispectral.com/history.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2004).
75 See generally Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2002); see also Werbach, supra note 3.
76 See generally Benjamin, supra note 8.
77 FCC News, FCC Expands Spectrum Leasing Rules & Speeds Processing to Create
Additional Opportunities for Access to Spectrum Through Secondary Markets, (Ret. No. 04-
167), Dkt. No. 00-230, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/Doc-
249427Al.pdf (July 8, 2004).
78 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECTRUM POLICY FOR THE 2 1
S
T CENTURY - THE
PRESIDENT'S SPECTRUM POLICY INITIATIVE: REPORT 1, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SPECTRUM TASK FORCE 4-6, 27 (2004), at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/specpolini/presspecpolinireportl_06242004.htm (last vis-
ited July 29, 2004). The Report also sees a role for non-market treatment of spectrum in
some cases, too. Id. at 27.
79 Indeed, property rights as they pertain to land use continue to be hotly debated in
some contexts, such as how they relate to environmental concerns.
80 Address of Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Oglethorpe University, May 22, 1932, Works
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appropriate, commons. Perhaps due to inflexible law and regulation, radio
spectrum brought only three channels of TV to the United States, but cable TV
and telephone wires brought hundreds of channels and billions of web pages.
With more efficient law and regulation, speedily implemented, the radio
spectrum can spawn the next billion-fold improvement for American
consumers.
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, at http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1932d.htm (last visited June 9,
2003).
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